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1THE DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF BIRTH RANK
1.  The Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument (Leslie 1989, 1996), as standardly presented, relies on the
assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I will demonstrate that the
Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank.
As I will show, this allows one to reply to Bostrom’s (2001, 2002) defense of the Doomsday argument
against the refutation suggested by Dieks (1992), and independently developed by Kopf et. al. (1994)
and Bartha and Hitchcock (1999).
The Doomsday argument runs as follows (following Bostrom 2001). Suppose that you have
narrowed the possibilities for doom down to two:
H1: “there will have been a total of 200 billion humans.”
H2: “there will have been a total of 200 trillion humans.”
Let us suppose that these hypotheses agree on the number of humans that exist on Earth from 20:41 to
20:42 GMT on August 15, 2001. This supposition is not a standard part of the Doomsday argument,
but it does not affect the Doomsday argument, and it is needed for my argument below. There are two
reasons this supposition is reasonable. First, if the hypotheses disagreed on the number of humans that
exist during that time period, then in principle it would be easy to falsify one of them, by checking
population figures. (This point is made by Dieks 2001, 3.) Second, since the hypotheses are meant to
represent the possibilities that doom will come soon and that doom will come late, the hypotheses
should be understood as agreeing on the number of humans that exist up to now and into the short-term
2future; they disagree only about how many humans will exist in the long-term future. 
After considering the various ways in which human life might end, you assign the following
probabilities:
Pr(H1) = 0.05
Pr(H2) = 0.95.
You also know proposition R: “I am the 60 billionth human to have been born”. Reasoning with the
Self-Sampling Assumption:
(SSA) Observers should reason as if they were a random sample from the set of all observers
in their reference class,
you have the following conditional probabilities:
Pr(R | H1) = 1/200 billions
Pr(R | H2) = 1/200 trillions.
Bayes’ theorem then gives the result that Pr(H1 | R) = 0.98. Since you know R, your posterior
probability for H1 is 0.98 – doom is likely to come soon.
2.  Suppose that you have no knowledge of your birth rank. How could the Doomsday argument still
be given? What is needed is a property p such you know you have p, and the total number having p
would be the same regardless of whether H1 or H2 is true. We each possess such properties, and thus
the Doomsday argument does apply. For me, one such property would be the property of being alone
in 1423 Patterson Office Tower in Lexington, Kentucky, from 20:41 to 20:42 GMT on August 15,
2001. Call that property t, and let T be the proposition that someone has property t. Before 20:42 I did
3not know that T is true, but now I do. I can model this learning that T by conditionalization using my
prior probability function Pr*: for any proposition A, 
Pr(A) = Pr*(A | T)
Note that it is reasonable for Pr* to be such that the probability of T does not depend on whether H1
or H2 is true:
Pr*(T | H1) = Pr*(T | H2) = Pr*(T)
If this were not the case, then conditionalization on T would shift my probabilities for H1 and H2. The
reason it is reasonable for Pr* to be such that T does not depend on H1 or H2 is that H1 and H2 agree
on the number of humans existing on Earth from 20:41 to 20:42 GMT on August 15, 2001. It follows
that
Pr(H1) = Pr*(H1) and Pr(H2) = Pr*(H2). 
Now, let M be the proposition that I have property t. Reasoning using the SSA,
Pr(M | H1) = 1/200 billions
Pr(M | H2) = 1/200 trillions.
Bayes’ theorem then gives the result that Pr(H1 | M) = 0.98. Since I know M, my posterior probability
for H1 is again 0.98. 
3.  The reply to the Doomsday argument given by for example Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) relies on
what Bostrom (2001, 382) calls the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA): roughly, “finding that you exist
gives you reason to think that there are many observers”. The idea behind Bartha and Hitchcock’s 
reply is that conditionalizing on your existence shifts probabilities in favor of H2, and the Doomsday
4argument shifts probabilities in favor of H1, and these two shifts cancel each other out. Bostrom has
recently argued against this reply to the Doomsday argument by presenting a scenario for which he
claims that the SIA leads to unintuitive results. I will defend the SIA and Bartha and Hitchcock’s reply.
Bostrom’s (2001, 383; 2002, Chapter 7) scenario is as follows. It is the year 2100, and
physicists assign probability 0.5 each to theories T1 and T2. T1 entails that there are a total of a trillion
trillion observers, while T2 entails that there are a total of a trillion trillion trillion observers. We do not
know our birth ranks, even approximately. Physicists are going to do an experiment to decide between
T1 and T2, but before they do a presumptuous philosopher explains that there is no need for the
physicists to do the experiment. The presumptuous philosopher says that since he exists, that makes it
more likely that there are more observers – T2 is a trillion times more likely than T1. 
Bostrom’s idea here is that, since we have no knowledge of our birth ranks in this scenario, we
can only get the first probability shift via the SIA in favor of more observers; we cannot get the second
Doomsday shift in favor of fewer observers. But as I have shown, the Doomsday argument can be
given even when we have no knowledge of our birth rank. We would have to specify that T1 and T2
agree on the number of observers existing in some appropriate spacetime region, but this is a legitimate
assumption to make. (We can pick the region such that, if the hypotheses disagreed, then in principle it
would be easy to falsify one of them, by checking population figures.) Thus, Bostrom’s scenario does
not show the unreasonableness of the SIA, and Bartha and Hitchcock’s reply to the Doomsday
argument is unrefuted. 
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